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MAY v. ANDERSON:
PREAMBLE TO FAMILY LAW CHAOS
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.*
N 1953, the Supreme Court decided May v. Anderson.1 Justice
Burton wrote an opinion in which three of his brethren joined.
Justice Frankfurter concurred, and three judges dissented. Justice Clark
did not participate. There is language in the majority and concurring
opinions which, if taken to be the law, raises serious problems of family
law, special protection of neglected children, and social control of
juvenile delinquency. A reconsideration of the issues at stake and
of the consequences flowing from the decision seems in order. Such
a reconsideration should lead to an abandonment, or at least a retreat
from, the unfortunate position taken in the case.
Before proceeding to the case, it is perhaps appropriate to rehearse
certain familiar propositions about the role of the Court in our legal
system. As our ultimate legal arbiter, the Supreme Court of the United
States has at once great power and great responsibility. The power
of judicial review is, however, a negative one. It is negative in the
technical sense that it "amounts to little more than the negative power
to disregard an unconstitutional enactment, which otherwise would
stand in the way of the enforcement of a legal right." 2 It is negative
in a more fundamental sense, too, for the Court has only a restricted
capacity to initiate remedies for acknowledged social ills.3 Thus the
power of judicial review is characteristically one of veto of the pro-
posals advanced by some other organ of government.
The impact of the power on congressional legislation presents prob-
lems enough. As against state legislation, the negative character of the
Court's power has additional dimensions. Notwithstanding the per-
vasiveness of federal activity, the largest part of the nation's daily
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Member, Oregon
State Bar. B.A., 1953, Swarthmore College; LL.B., 1954, Columbia University.
1. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
2. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
3. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) ("no court can affirmatively re-
map the Blinois districts so as to bring them more in conformity with the standards
of fairness for a representative system."). But see Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954), rehearing on relief, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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affairs are and will continue to be regulated by the law, statutory or
common, of the several states.4 This means that when the Court strikes
down state action as violative of the Constitution, under the due process
clause or otherwise, or when it imposes limitations on the extraterritorial
validity or effect of state action, as by withholding full faith and credit,
the consequence is very likely to be that no agency of government will
provide a substitute solution to the problem in question. This is par-
ticularly true, it might be added, in family law.5
In the exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is subject
to little restriction, at least immediately, except the conscience of its
members. It is not, of course, responsible to any other chamber or to the
voters. But the Court is also unrestricted in that it is not required to
anticipate or to solve the problems which are unresolved or are created
by its pronouncements. Having said what may not be done, the Court
is under no obligation to say what should be done. This unpleasant
task is often left for others, the legislature and the executive. And the
task must be undertaken within the legal limits imposed by the Court on
the one hand and the political limits imposed by the electorate on the
other.
In recognition of the heavy personal responsibility imposed by its
political independence, the Court has in the past adhered to certain
methodological canons designed to keep the exercise of its power within
tolerable bounds.6 Principal among these is the rule that the Court will
not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."
One important function of these canons, and the foregoing rule
4. See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L. REv.
489 (1954). The point is demonstrated clearly, if not scientifically, by comparing
the subject index to the United States Code with the subject index of the codified
statutes of any of the states.
5. Congress has never attempted to regulate matters of family law. Even if a con-
stitutional basis for congressional action exists, the controversial character of many
aspects of family law, such as grounds for divorce, makes it improbable that Congress
will undertake to act. Consider, for example, that in the much disputed field of labor
law a "no man's land" has existed for over a decade, and the boundaries of the
"no man's land" delimited for over four years, but Congress has done nothing to
remedy the situation. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957). See
also Note, Congressional Reversal of Supreme Court Decisions: 1945-1957, 71 HAv.
L. Rv. 1324 (1958).
6. The classic summary of the rules is found in Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion
in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936).
7. Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration,
113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885).
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in particular, is to limit the size of the swath cut by judicial negation
so that the legislative power is presently circumscribed no more strin-
gently than is necessary. In this way, the organs of government which
are capable of and responsible for initiating action to meet social
problems will be able to do so with minimal restrictions on their choice
of means. Furthermore, if the decision is confined to the issue pre-
sented, hopefully the record will disclose the practical consequences
of a judicial veto. Whether this is so, of course, varies with the nature
of the case, the procedural stage at which the constitutional question
arises, and, above all, the skill and resourcefulness of counsel. But even
in the face of the most unilluminating record, the court will usually
have some idea of the practical consequence of deciding the issue pre-
sented. When the court sweeps beyond the immediate issue presented,
however, the danger is that its choice of rule, indeed its choice of
language, may have unanticipated ramifications imperiling social in-
terests of the most pressing character.
What has been said so far is rudimentary. But in May v. Anderson
the Court neglected the canons of narrow decision. The tragic con-
sequences may be with us for many years.
THE CASE PRESENTED
The facts in May v. Anderson were these:8 Mrs. Anderson (now
Mrs. May) was a native of Wisconsin. She married Anderson in that
state and lived there with him continuously thereafter. They had three
children. In December, 1946, as a result of growing marital unhappiness,
Mrs. Anderson considered getting a divorce and went to Ohio "to
think it over." She took the children with her. In a telephone conver-
sation on New Year's Day, 1947, she told her husband from Ohio that
she was not coming back to him.
The husband then filed suit for divorce in Wisconsin, delivering a
copy of the summons and complaint to Mrs. Anderson in Ohio. A
decree was entered granting him a divorce and awarding him custody
of the children, subject to visitation rights given Mrs. Anderson. Armed
with the decree, Anderson came to Ohio in February, 1947 and ob-
tained the children (peaceably and without stealth) from Mrs. Ander-
8. The facts are taken from the Supreme Court's opinion and also from the opinion
of the lower court in Anderson v. May, 91 Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E.2d 358 (1952),
from which the appeal to the Supreme Court was taken. The Ohio Supreme Court
had refused to entertain an appeal. See Anderson v. May, 157 Ohio St. 436, 105
N2E.2d 648 (1952).
1959]
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son. The children continued to live with him from that date until
July, 1951. In that month, Anderson brought the children to Ohio to
visit their mother, apparently in pursuance of the visitation right given
her by the Wisconsin decree. Mrs. Anderson, now remarried, refused
to redeliver the children. Anderson brought habeas corpus to obtain
their return.
Under Ohio practice, habeas corpus draws in question only the
right of immediate possession of the children. The court is not per-
mitted to reconsider the merits of a custody award or to inquire whether
the welfare of the child is best served by the prior decree. The Ohio
court found that at the time of the divorce (1) Mrs. Anderson was
domiciled and present in Ohio, (2) Mr. Anderson was domiciled and
present in Wisconsin, and (3) the children were domiciled in Wisconsin
but present in Ohio. No significance was attached to the fact that be-
tween the granting of the decree in February, 1947, and the visitation
of the children to Ohio in 1951, the children had been both domiciled
and present in Wisconsin.
The Ohio court determined that the Wisconsin domicile of the
children was a sufficient basis for the courts of that state to determine
custody and, since Wisconsin had awarded custody to the husband,
Ohio was bound to honor and enforce that decree. The mother ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed.
As has been suggested, May v. Anderson was a case in which ob-
servance of the Court's methodological canons was peculiarly appro-
priate. The scope of inquiry in the proceedings below made irrelevant
much background informationY The opinions both of the trial court
and the lower appellate court left much to be desired regarding the
legal principles involved and were silent as to applicable policy con-
siderations. The brief submitted to the Supreme Court by the appellant
mother was perhaps adequate; the brief of the respondent father was not.
No public body was involved, no public interest asserted. But a
moment's reflection, even if confined to the problems presented in
the Court's own precedents, should have warned that important issues
were at stake. In these circumstances any decision at all would entail
9. This information would include the character and parental competence of the re-
spective parents, the degree to which the children were attached to them, the quality
of the home provided by the husband, the quality of the home which the mother
could provide, the quality of the adjustment which the children had made and the
probable effects on the children of changing their domestic environment.
[Vol. 45
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risk of unforeseen consequences. Certainly a decision on grounds any
broader than immediately necessary would entail that risk.
In presenting the issue, counsel for appellant complied with the
canons of narrow adjudication. Both in his jurisdictional statement
and his brief he stated the problem thus:
First, can a court have jurisdiction to award a child's custody when
the child is outside the State at the time the court enters its decree and
the court has jurisdiction neither of the child's person nor the person
of the parent who has the child with him outside the state?
Second, there having been only constructive service on the parent who
has the child outside the state, is that parent in any way bound by
the custody decree?' 0
Thus, as counsel reiterated, the issue was whether domicile of the
child, the parent and child both being absent from the state, was a
sufficient basis for a state to make a custody award binding on the absent
parent.
Now, it should be said at once that if the decision is read for the
least that it holds, if it is read as deciding only the foregoing issue,
it may be unexceptionable. It is true that many courts have assumed
jurisdiction to decide custody on the basis of the child's domicile
alone." It is also true that Beale's Restatement of Conflicts says that
the child's domicile is not only a sufficient basis but the exclusive basis
for determining his custody.' 2 However, it seems clear that these
views have been repudiated, if indeed they were ever fully accepted. 13
The decision in May v. Anderson can be interpreted as deciding only
the issue tendered,'4 and has been so interpreted." But the language
10. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant, p. 4; Brief for Appellant, p. 4. (Emphasis
added.)
11. Many of the cases are collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434 (1950). See also
Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7 CoRNFLL L.Q. 1, 5 (1921).
12. See RSrATEm-NT, Co~NFLIcr OF LAws §§ 117, 146, 148 (1934). But cf. id. §§ 118,
150.
13. See 1 EHRFNZwEIG, CONFLIcr OF LAws 277 (1959); EHRENZWEIG, SELECTED RPADINGS
ON CONFLICr OF LAws 822 (1956); Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody
Decrees, 51 Mica. L. REv. 345 (1953); Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across
State Lines, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 819 (1944); cf. Stumberg, The Status of
Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 42 (1940).
14. An indication of the fact that the issue presented required no broader disposition
is the last footnote in the Court's opinion, 345 U.S. at 534 n.8., where Justice Burton
says: "'[There is no jurisdiction over] . .. children who are not within the jurisdiction
1959]
HeinOnline -- 45 Va. L. Rev.  383 1959
384 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 45
goes further. Justice Burton said the "narrow issue" 16 presented was
this:
[W]e have before us the elemental question whether a court of a
state, where a mother is neither domiciled, resident nor present, may
cut off her immediate right to the care, custody, management and
companionship of her minor children without having jurisdiction over
her in personam. Rights far more precious to appellant than prop-
erty rights will be cut off if she is to be bound .... 17
He then went on to say this:
In Estin v. Estin ... we held Nevada powerless to cut off ... a
spouse's right to financial support... In the instant case, we recognize
that a mother's right to custody of her children is a personal right
entitled to at least as much protection as her right to alimony.
Wisconsin [did not have] . . .the personal jurisdiction that it must
have in order to deprive their mother of her personal right to their
immediate possession.' 8
If this language means anything, it means that a state may not de-
prive a parent of custody unless the parent has been personally served
with process within the territorial limits of the state. Justice Burton
quite apparently intended this rule to apply even if the child had been
present in the state and before the rendering court. The opinion has
been so interpreted."
The concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter went off on a dif-
ferent tack. He seems to say that Wisconsin had jurisdiction to enter
of the court when the decree is rendered, where the defendant ... has neither been
personally served ... nor appeared ....'"
15. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 166 Ohio St. 203, 141 NE.2d 172 (1957); Guyette
v. Haley, 286 App. Div. 451, 144 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Swope v. Swope, 163
Ohio St. 59, 125 NE.2d 336 (1955); see Hutchins v. Moore, 97 So. 2d 748 (Miss. 1957).
But cf. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, on remand, 248 N.C. 742, 104 S.E.2d 882 (1958).
16. 345 U.S. at 532.
17. 345 U.S. at 533.
18. 345 U.S. at 533-34.
19. See 345 U.S. 536, 539-40 (dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson); Cooper v. Cooper,
318 S.W.2d 587 (Ark. 1958); Dahike v. Dahlke, 97 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1957); Aufiero v.
Auflero, 332 Mass. 149, 123 NE.2d 709 (1955); Kallet v. Fitzpatrick, 131 N.Y.S.2d 9
(Sup. Ct. 1954); cf. Meredith v. Meredith, 226 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Hopson v.
Hopson, 221 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
HeinOnline -- 45 Va. L. Rev.  384 1959
1959] May v. Anderson
the original custody decree2" but that child custody awards, and perhaps
other adjudications touching children, are not entided to full faith and
credit when pitted against a claimed local interest in the child, here
Ohio's interest.21 Because Justice Frankfurter's vote was necessary to
the disposition of the case, and perhaps also because his response was
within the issue tendered the Court, May v. Anderson has been read as
deciding what he says it decided.2-
Both the majority and concurring opinions in May v. Anderson
invite questions concerning precedent and logic. It is not the purpose
20. "This Court does not decide that Ohio would be precluded from recognizing,
as a matter of local law, the disposition made by the Wisconsin court. For Ohio to
give respect to the Wisconsin decree would not offend the Due Process Clause."
345 U.S. at 535-36.
21. 'Troperty, personal claims, and even the marriage status ... give rise to interests
different from those relevant to the discharge of a State's continuing responsibility
to children within her borders . . . . [Tihe child's welfare in a custody case has
such a claim upon the State that its responsibility is obviously not to be foreclosed
by a prior adjudication reflecting another State's discharge of its responsibility at
another time." 345 U.S. at 536. He developed this theme at greater length in Kovacs
v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 609 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
22. In light of Burton's language, some courts have read Frankfurter's opinion
as saying that the prior custody decree is not entitled to full faith and credit if it
was rendered without personal jurisdiction of the parent now attacking it. See People
ex rel. Pritchett v. Pritchett, 1 App. Div. 2d 1009, 151 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1956); Armstrong
v. Armstrong, 99 Ohio App. 7, 130 N.E.2d 710 (1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 568 (1956);
Worthley v. Worthley, 258 P.2d 588 (Cal. App. 1953), aff'd, 267 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1954),
aff'd as modified, 44 Cal. 2d 465 283 P.2d 19 (1955); cf. In re Adoption of a Minor, 214
F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Other courts have interpreted Frankfurter as saying that
a custody decree is not binding in a sister state even if both parents were before
the rendering court. See Casteel v. Casteel, 45 N.J. Super. 338, 132 A.2d 529 (App.
Div. 1957); Aufiero v. Aufiero, 332 Mass. 149, 123 N.E.2d 709 (1955); cf. Bachman
v. Mejias, I N.Y.2d 575, 136 NE.2d 866 (1956). But see Brazy v. Brazy, 5 Wis. 2d
352, 92 NAV.2d 738 (1958). In the light of Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the subsequent
case of Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 609 (1958), the latter seems to be the correct
interpretation.
Justice Jackson dissented in May v. Anderson on the ground that the state in which
the children were domiciled had jurisdiction to make a custody award and that such
an award should be granted full faith and credit, subject, however, to the power
of any other interested state to modify the decree or to intervene to protect the child.
Justice Jackson would adhere to the rule in New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330
U.S. 610 (1947), that a custody decree which is subject to modification where granted
is subject, as a practical matter, to modification elsewhere. He thus disagreed with
Burton on the jurisdictional point and with Frankfurter on the effect to be given the
Wisconsin decree.
Justice Reed concurred with Jackson. Justice Minton dissented on the ground that
the question of the jurisdiction of the Wisconsin court had not been raised below.
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here to explore these questions so much as to raise them. Extended
answers will have to await further scholarship.
THE MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Burton tells us that a parent may not be deprived of the
custody of his child unless the parent is personally served with process
within the state. For this proposition he cites no precedent whatever.23
On the contrary, even a cursory examination would have disclosed that
courts large both in number and respectability had thought otherwise.
Many have held that personal jurisdiction of both parents is sufficient,
,even though the child is absent from the state.24 Many have held that
presence of the child is sufficient, even though there is no personal
jurisdiction over one of the parents.2 But until May v. Anderson,
no one supposed that personal jurisdiction over both parents was
indispensible to jurisdiction.
Justice Burton's views are not only without support in precedent,
but they will not, in my view, withstand critical analysis. To sustain
his position, Justice Burton relied on the rule in Pennoyer v. Neff,26
and particularly its application in Estin v. Estin,' where an ex parte
divorce was held not to cut off the absent wife's rights under a previous
support award. The argument is that since the right to custody is
"far more precious" than mere money claims, a fortiori custody cannot
be denied without personal jurisdiction.
There are several objections to this argument. First, the Court has
sapped Pennoyer v. Neff of most of its vitality, particularly in cases
where practical considerations make its application onerous.28 Secondly,
23. The cases on which he relies, Carter v. Carter, 201 Ga. 850, 41 S.E.2d 532 (1947);
Sanders v. Sanders, 223 Mo. App. 834, 14 S.W.2d 458 (1929); Weber v. Redding,
200 Ind. 448, 163 N.E. 269 (1928), all involved situations where the rendering court
had neither personal jurisdiction over the objecting parent nor over the child. Burton's
view has been correctly characterized as a "major upheaval." Comment, Full Faith and
Credit to Child Custody Awards, 5 KAN. L. REv. 77, 81 (1956).
24. For a discussion and analysis, see Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197
P.2d 739 (1948). For a collection of the cases see Annor., 9 A.L.R.2d 434 (1950). See
also Note, jurisdictional Bases of Custody Decrees, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1024, 1026 (1940).
25. See Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7 (1949); cf. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 NE.
624 (1925). See also Aufiero v. Aufiero, 332 Mass. 149, 123 N.E.2d 709 (1955); Stum-
berg, supra note 13.
26. 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (personal jurisdiction required to render in personam judg-
ment).
27. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
28. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Mullane v. Central
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Pennoyer v. Neff itself excepted cases involving "status," 29 and there
is abundant authority treating problems of children generally and
custody problems in particular as involving "status." 30 While caution
is required in dealing with a concept so vague as "status," surely an
inquiry is merited into the policy considerations which underlie its
repeated invocation.
Objection to the argument is made more cogent by the developments
in ex parte divorce.3 1 Why is it that personal jurisdiction is not re-
quired to sever a spouse's marital ties to his mate but is required to
sever (or curtail) a parent's parental ties to his child? There is no
logical basis at all on which to differentiate so sharply between the
two situations.32 By any calculus, the rights are in substantial parity,
both of them "far more precious" than monetary claims. This is not
to suggest that the jurisdictional basis for severance of parental ties
should necessarily be the same as that for severance of marital ties.
,It only suggests how unsound it is to say, as the Court has, that
Pennoyer v. Neff applies with full vigor to the one and not at all to
the other.
There are more fundamental objections. In telling us that the
parental rights are "far more precious" than monetary claims, the Court
makes an appeal which only obscures the problem. The rights of a
parent in his child are indeed precious. The parent is a human being
in whom parenthood evokes the deepest feelings, needs, and hopes.
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). See generally Ehrenzweig,
The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forumz Con-
veniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of the
Mullane Case, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 305 (1951). But see Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354
U.S. 416, 418 (1957); cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
29. 95 U.S. at 733-34 (1877). Furthermore, Justice Field defined due process as "a
course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which have been
established in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of
private rights." Id. at 734. It might have been well worth while to inquire into the
historic usages of equity courts, as distinct from common law courts rendering money
judgments, regarding the necessity for personal jurisdiction in custody and similar
proceedings. Cf. Coler v. Corn Exch. Bank, 250 N.Y. 136, 164 N.E. 882 (1928), aff'd,
280 U.S. 218 (1930).
30. See, e.g., Beckmann v. Beckmann, 358 Mo. 1029, 218 S.W.2d 566 (1949); Hersey
v. Hersey, 271 Mass. 545, 171 N.E. 815 (1930); 2 BEALE, CONFLICr oF LAWS §§ 144.1-
148.1; Goodrich, supra note 11, at 2.
31. For a brief summary of the cases since Williams v. North Carolina 1, see Vander-
bilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 421-23 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
32. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 541 (1953) (dissenting opinion); Hartford
v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 447, 453-54, 304 P.2d 1, 4 (1956).
1959]
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But the child is also a human being, with feelings, needs, and hopes
corresponding to those of the parent. The child, however, has
not yet developed those protective devices summarized in the term
"maturity" which enable an adult to maintain equilibrium in the face
of the emotional battering life inflicts upon him. Thus, the child's
right to parental care, if anything, is greater than the parent's right to
have care of the child. We search Justice Burton's opinion in vain
for any awareness of this consideration. On the contrary, by telling
us how precious are the rights of the parent, he implies that these rights
alone are involved.33
There is more to it than this. The divorce materially changes the
content of the custody right of the respective parents. While the
parents live together in marriage, each is able to exercise his right
without infringing on the right of the other parent. When the divorce
occurs, the parent given custody retains much the same right of custody
as before. For the other parent, however, the parental right will be
substantially or completely extinguished. This is true no matter which
parent has custody of the child and no matter how many times custody
is changed. No amount of adjudication, indeed nothing short of the
parents' remarrying each other, can change this basic fact. Thus, to
speak of the right of custody after divorce as "precious" is, so far as
concerns the parent denied custody, to characterize the agony of
its severance rather than to describe its content.
Finally, there is no mention by Justice Burton of the parental duties
which accompany the parental right. When the family is split by
divorce the parents become independent entities, each more or less
capable of going his own way and of making a new home for himself.
Not so the child. Someone must provide for him, and it remains the
33. Justice Burton even goes so far as to say that the problem of parental rights
is "separated ... from that of the future interests of the children." May v. Anderson,
supra note 32, at 533. Underlying Justice Burton's analysis seems to be the idea that
a parent seeking the custody of his child invariably does so because of his love for
the child. Compare with this naive view, Davis, Children of Divorced Parents-
Sociological and Statistical Analysis, 10 LAW & Coirmtp. PROD. 700, 708 (1944) ("[The
child] is, after the divorce, the sole remaining link between the former mates, and
consequently serves as the only instrument through which they can express their
mutual resentment.'); Plant, Children of Divorced Parents-The Psychiatrist Views
Children of Divorced Parents, 10 LAw & CosvrEmp. PRoB. 807 passim. (1944). Indeed,
the parent who most loves the child may be the one who is willing to suffer the
loneliness of the child's absence rather than upset the child's life by squabbling
over his custody. For an earlier judicial recognition of this problem, see 1 Kings
3:16-28.
[Vol. 45
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parents' duty to see that this is done. The parent having custody must
provide an approximation of the home which the divorce destroyed;
the parent not given custody must so conduct himself as to make
the approximation successful. These duties are obviously different from
the parental duties arising in an undivided family. Moreover, the
duties are more difficult to discharge. They are made so by loneliness,
lingering enmity between the spouses and, in the case of the parent
not having custody, the lack of recompense arising from the child's
companionship.
What has been said is so commonplace as to make surprising the
necessity for its mention. But the Court is completely silent on these
important points. When the Court speaks of the "precious" parental
right, without recognizing that in the case of one parent or the other
the right has little or no content, without recognizing that the child
has some rights at stake also, and without mentioning parental duties,
one has the feeling that the Court simply failed to face the problem
squarely. Worse, one must conclude that the Court has ignored the
implications which these facts hold for resolving the jurisdictional prob-
lem.
THE CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Frankfurter, it will be recalled, placed his decision, not on
the want of Wisconsin's jurisdiction to award custody, but on the
want of duty in Ohio to honor the award. Thus, superficially at least,
he speaks only of full faith and credit and not of due process. Although
perhaps subject to fewer infirmities than Justice Burton's opinion,
Justice Frankfurter's view seems also subject to serious objections.
In the first place, if the full faith and credit clause is taken literally,
it applies to custody decrees as well as to other judicial decrees. It
is indeed true that forceful arguments can be made that it should not
be so applied. We may grant that in child custody cases, as in other
matters of intense local interest,3 4 full faith and credit perhaps should
not be given willy-nilly to all aspects of all sister state adjudications.
But to concede that the clause should not be applied inexorably is
not to demonstrate that it should not be applied at all. Furthermore,
it is not to demonstrate that the policy underlying the clause-interstate
stability of established legal relations-has no application to child
custody problems.
34. See, e.g., Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935)
(workmen's compensation).
19591
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Second, the problems of jurisdiction and full faith and credit are
so intertwined as a practical matter that when credit is wholly with-
held from a decree, the jurisdictional basis on which it is rendered is
simultaneously eroded. What content is there in a power to act if the
consequences of its exercise can be avoided simply by taking the
child elsewhere? When it is said that the present forum's interest is
so great that the judgment of the rendering state is entitled to no
credit, is it not necessarily said that the rendering state's interest is
wholly temporary? When everyone is able to decide a question,
surely it is decided by no one.
Finally, while Justice Frankfurter is eloquent about the interests of
the state in protecting its children, he is silent about the interest of
the child who is the subject of protection. In allowing each state to
decide afresh what is good for the child, we assure that the child can
be the subject of inconsistent commands, and yet consistency of com-
mand is a precept in rearing children. Justice Frankfurter's rule would
thus allow a child's domestic environment to be transitory. Even
worse, a conscientious court, aware that it will lose control of the situa-
tion if the child is permitted to be out of the state, may feel that it
has a narrowed choice of alternatives in trying to determine what will
be best for the child."
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECISION
The logical deficiencies in the Court's decision have been suggested.
If, as we are told, the life of the law is not logic but experience, it is
appropriate to inquire into the consequences of May v. Anderson. This
examination reveals even greater deficiencies.
Because of the grounds of decision chosen by Justice Burton for the
Court, and Justice Frankfurter as the decisive voter, May v. Anderson
35. See Butler v. Perry, 210 Md. 332, 123 A.2d 453 (1956), for an illustration of this
consequence in particularly heartrending circumstances. In that case, the child's father
killed his mother and was sent to prison. The paternal grandparents, residents of
Pennsylvania, and the maternal grandmother, a resident of Maryland, each sought the
child's custody. A most careful examination was made of the child, of the respective
grandparents themselves, and of their economic and domestic circumstances. Both
prospective custodians were found suitable, although the Pennsylvania grandparents
could offer the child somewhat better material surroundings. Custody was awarded
the Maryland grandmother. The Court cited May v. Anderson and expressed as the
deciding element the fact that if the child were moved to Pennsylvania, Maryland's
power to continue control of the situation would be lost. See also Note, 1953 U. ILL.
L.F. 644, 647, to the effect that the May case will lead the rendering court to withhold
the right to have children visit a parent who lives out of state.
[Vol. 45
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can be used and is being used as a double-barrelled weapon for as-
saulting custody decrees. If the parent attacking the decree was not
personally served within the state in the proceeding in which the decree
was rendered, then he relies on Justice Burton's jurisdictional language
and claims himself not bound.36 He does this even if the child was
before the rendering court." If the parent was before the rendering
court, then he relies on Justice Frankfurter's concurrence and claims
that the local court should make an independent inquiry regarding
the child's custody.3s The results of this instability are manifold. Some
of them have already manifested themselves; others are foreseeable.
Divorce Custody Cases
The impact of May v. Anderson on divorce custody cases has been
to exacerbate the condition created by New York ex rel. Halvey v.
Halvey.39 In that case the family lived in New York. The wife went
to Florida with the children and obtained an ex parte divorce containing
a custody award in her favor. The husband abducted the children and
took them back to New York. In the wife's New York habeas corpus
proceeding to obtain custody of the children, the Supreme Court held
that New York was not required to enforce the Florida decree's terms
because those terms were subject to modification by the Florida court
36. See cases cited notes 15 & 19 supra.
37. See cases cited note 19 supra.
38. See Commonwealth ex. rel. Gregory v. Gregory, 146 A.2d 624 (Pa. Super. 1958);
Casteel v. Casteel, 45 N.J. Super. 338, 132 A.2d 529 (App. Div. 1957); Aufiero v.
Aufiero, 332 Mass. 149, 123 NXE.2d 709 (1955); cf. Bachman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575,
136 NE.2d 866 (1956).
39. 330 U.S. 610 (1947). It is not proposed here to add to the voluminous literature
on "divisible divorce" otherwise than in connection with child custody. The starting
place for "divisible divorce" was, of course, Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S.
287 (1942), holding that the state in which one spouse is domiciled may grant a divorce
to which full faith and credit must be given even though the matrimonial domicile
was elsewhere, and even though there was no personal jurisdiction of the other spouse.
Subsequent developments cast a queer light on the reasons assigned for the first
Williams decision. Speaking for the Court, Justice Douglas said, "each state as a
sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the marital status of persons domiciled
within its borders .. . . Protection of offspring, property interests, and the enforce-
ment of marital responsibilities are but a few of commanding problems in the field
of domestic relations with which the state must deal." 317 U.S. at 298. With this,
compare New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947) and May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1945) (protection of offspring); Armstrong v. Armstrong,
350 U.S. 568, 575 (1956) (concurring opinion) (property interests); Estin v. Estin,
334 U.S. 541 (1948) and Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957) (enforcement
of marital responsibilities).
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itself. According to Halvey, it would seem that a custody decree sub-
ject to modification in the state where rendered was subject to practical
modification in any other state in which the children might subsequently
be found.
The logical coherence of Halvey is doubtful.40 The practical con-
sequences of Halvey are certainly not. As Justice Rutledge then feared,
the struggle between divorced spouses over the custody of their chil-
dren has transcended the brutality and irregularity of guerrilla war-
fare.41 The child is filched from classroom,4" playground,43 public
street,44 or his home,45 transported out of the state and perhaps across
country by the abducting parent,46 there to be held pending a counter-
foray by the other parent. Meanwhile, each parent recruits the as-
sistance of his home court,47 sometimes of courts elsewhere,48 seeking
40. The argument ran this way: (1) Full faith and credit requires the enforcing
state (New York) to give the foreign decree only such force as it has in the rendering
state (Florida); (2) A Florida custody decree is subject to modification in Florida
on the basis not only of changed circumstances but also on the basis of facts existing
but not presented at the original hearing, and is therefore "not res judicata .. .except
as to the facts before the court at the time of judgment." 330 U.S. at 613. (3) There-
fore, "what Florida could do in modifying the decree, New York may do." 330
U.S. at 614. But one of the facts presented in Florida and not subject to modification
was that the child was within the protective jurisdiction of the Florida court, however
that jurisdiction might from time to time be exercised. The argument in Halvey
confuses the finality of the disposition with the finality of the assumption of power
to make a disposition. Perhaps it was a glimmering of this infirmity which led the
court to decide May v. Anderson the way it did.
41. He anticipated "a continuing round of litigation over custody, perhaps also
of abduction, between alienated parents. That consequence can hardly be thought
conducive to the child's welfare." 330 U.S. at 619 (concurring opinion).
42. Commonwealth ex rel. Schofield v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super. 631, 98 A.2d
437 (1953).
43. Scott v. Scott, 227 Ind. 396, 86 NZE.2d 533 (1949).
44. Casteel v. Casteel, 45 NJ. Super. 338, 132 A.2d 529 (App. Div. 1957).
45. Conley v. Conley, 324 Mass. 530, 87 N.E.2d 153 (1949). A more frequently used
device is the refusal to return a child at the end of a visitation period, as occurred in
May v. Anderson. State ex rel. Girtman v. Ricketson, 221 La. 691, 60 So. 2d 88 (1952),
appeal dismissed, 222 La. 576, 63 So. 2d 3 (1953); Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa
296, 41 N.W.2d 60 (1950).
46. See Heard v. Heard, 323 Mass. 357, 82 NE.2d 219 (1948). Sometimes the
abduction is followed by prolonged concealment. Lorenz v. Royer, 194 Ore. 355, 241
P.2d 142 (1952).
47. See State ex rel. Huhn v. Huhn, 224 La. 591, 70 So. 2d 391 (1954); Forbell v.
Forbell, 276 App. Div. 785, 93 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1949), opinion on remand, 198 Misc. 753,
103 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
48. See Little v. Little, 249 Ala. 144, 30 So. 2d 386 (1947); cf. Scott v. Scott, 227
Ind. 396, 86 N.E.2d 533 (1949). See generally Note, U. FLA. L. REv. 337, 342 (1958).
HeinOnline -- 45 Va. L. Rev.  392 1959
May v. Anderson
by various procedures49 to strengthen his grip on the child and to
loosen that of the other parent.
Under the Halvey rule, a parent could be advised to stay out of any
custody proceeding commenced by the other parent if there appeared
any serious chance of an adverse result. He could then resort to self help,
get the child before a more friendly court, and hope that the latter would
find either "changed conditions" or that the facts were not fully pre-
sented in the prior proceeding. Thus, child custody battles between
parents receiving good legal advice typically took the form of parallel
but inconsistent ex parte proceedings in which the opposite sides of
the same question were presented in separate actions rather than in one °0
But there was some risk in this strategy. If the court which first
made the award had a recognized jurisdictional basis for doing so, the
parent who stayed away in the first proceeding ran the risk that the
second court would honor the prior decree. The second court might do
so on one of several grounds: the abducting parent's "unclean hands"
in defying the prior decree,51 the fact that the first court acted on a
jurisdictional basis acknowledged by the second court to be superior, -52
the fact that the prior court's award was not subject to modification
except on the ground of changed conditions and no such change ap-
peared,5 3 or for some other reason. 4 Moreover, the second court, if
it did not feel obligated to enforce the prior award, still might feel
obligated not to ignore it. At least there would be lip service to the
49. See Walker v. Walker, 325 Mass. 738, 92 N.E.2d 373 (1950) (special statutory
proceedings); Forbell v. Forbell, 276 App. Div. 785, 93 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1949), opinion on
remand, 198 Misc. 753, 103 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Eddy v. Stauffer, 160 Fla.
944, 37 So. 2d 417 (1948) (divorce; equity bill); Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.
2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948) (separate divorces); Little v. Little, supra note 48.
50. See Edwards v. Edwards, 8 N.J. Super. 547, 73 A.2d 759 (Ch. 1950); cf. Com-
monwealth ex rel. Schofield v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super. 631, 98 A.2d 437 (1953). See
also, Graves, Strategy for Children Custody Suits Involving Conflict of Laws, 2 DU=E
BJ. 11 (1951).
51. See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MicH. L. REV.
345, 357-69 (1953), and cases there cited.
52. See Lorenz v. Royer, 194 Ore. 355, 241 P.2d 142 (1952) (state of child's domicile
has exclusive jurisdiction); In the matter of Morgan, 192 Misc. 352, 80 N.Y.S.2d 472
(Sup. Ct. 1948), modified on other grounds, 301 N.Y. 127, 93 N.E.2d 336 (1950)
(parties personally appeared in prior proceedings).
53. See Sappington v. Fort, 258 Ala. 528, 63 So. 2d 591 (1952); Lambertson v.
'Williams, 61 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1952); cf. Heard v. Heard, 323 Mass. 357, 82 N.E.2d
219 (1948).
54. See McKee v. McKee, 239 Iowa 1093, 32 N.W.2d 379 (1948), aff'd, 241 Iowa
434, 40 N.W.2d 924 (1950) (plaintiff failed to make timely challenge to foreign
decree set up by defendant).
1959]
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prior decree, and that lip service might be enough to decide a close
case.m
May v. Anderson has eliminated even this risk. Under the view
adopted by Justice Burton, the second court is required to ignore
the first decree if the parent adversely affected was not a party thereto.
This is so, of course, because the first court was without jurisdiction
and its decree is a nullity. If this is to be taken as the law, a parent
could be advised to stay away from any custody proceeding in which
his chances of success appear to be in the slightest degree less than his
chances of success in some other court.
Under the Frankfurter view in May v. Anderson, the parent has
even wider choice. He can appear in the first court, litigate to the
bitter end, and if he loses, simply take the child to some other state
and start all over again56 In sum, under the majority's rule parents may
ignore the courts;57 under the rule of the concurrence, they may defy
them.
55. See People ex rel. Koelsch v. Rone, 3 M1. 2d 483, 121 NE.2d 738 (1954); Lambert-
son v. Williams, 61 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1952); McKee v. McKee, supra note 54.
56. Justice Frankfurter's reliance on the proposition that each state must be free
to take protective action regarding children within its borders seems misplaced when
extended to divorce custody cases. Ordinarily the parens patriae doctrine is invoked
where the child has been neglected or abused. The public, through some appropriate
agency, becomes a party to the proceedings, at least in substance and generally also in
form. A more or less disinterested voice on behalf of the child is thus heard. But in
the divorce custody cases the "public interest" is not asserted automotively, but
rather by a litigating parent whose interests may or may not be the same as the
child's; indeed, whether the parent's interests are the same as the child's is the very
question before the court. In relying on the parens patriae doctrine to withhold full
faith and credit to a custody decree in a divorce proceeding, Justice Frankfurter ap-
parently overlooked Cardozo's wisdom in Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E.
624, 625 (1925): "The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the custody of infants found
within its territory . . .has its origin in the protection that is due to the incompetent
or helpless . . . For this, the residence of the child suffices, though the domicile
be elsewhere .... But the limits of the jurisdiction are suggested by its origin. The
residence of the child may not be used as a pretense for the adjudication of the status
of parents whose domicile is elsewhere, nor for a definition of parental rights dependent
on status .... Parents so situated must settle their controversies at home. Our courts
will hold aloof when intervention is unnecessary for the welfare of the child." It is
clear enough that the parens patriae jurisdiction is being used as a basis for intervention
in controversies between parents. See authorities cited note 58 infra. Some courts
invoke that jurisdiction with a citation of Finlay v. Finlay.
57. Justice Burton purported to reserve decision on cases where one parent evades
process or abducts the child: "The instant case does not present the special considera-
tions that arise where a parent, with or without minor children, leaves a jurisdiction for
the purpose of escaping process or otherwise evading jurisdiction, and we do not have
[Vol. 45
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In these circumstances, how "precious" is the parental right of
custody? What value attaches to a right that is not worth the paper
on which it is written? How much is a child protected under a system
of rules which encourages his parents to redetermine his custody fre-
quently, forcibly, and extra-legally? It seems quite clear that in its
ill-considered efforts to maximize protection of parental rights and to
protect the interest of children, the Court has dealt a crushing blow to
both.
Adoption
It has been suggested above that the consequences of May v. Anderson
may extend beyond divorce law." One body of law which may soon
here the considerations that arise when children are unlawfully or surreptitiously
taken by one parent from the other." May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 535 n.8 (1953).
This seems to be a concession that the Court's formula is too broad to cover the
complexities of the problem to which it is addressed. But if the Court means what
it says in the body of the opinion, what is saved by the footnote? Personal jurisdiction
is personal jurisdiction. To secure it under traditional doctrine, the defendant must be
personally served within the state, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), or at least
domiciled in the state, Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). If something less than
this will suffice for personal jurisdiction in a custody case, under the contacts approach
of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), what contacts are
required that were not present in May v. Anderson? Wisconsin was the place of
matrimonial domicile, domicile of the husband and children, immediate past domicile
of the wife, the place where the divorce cause of action arose, the place where the facts
had occurred on which the custody decision was based, and the place where the
children were resident before and after rendition of the decree.
The Court's excepting cases where the parent "unlawfully" takes the children really
excepts nothing. Until a valid custody decree is entered, both parents have an equal
right to the child's custody, and under the Court's rule, no such valid decree is entered
unless there be personal jurisdiction over the parent. Hence, under the Court's own
rule, the parent not personally served would never make an "unlawful" abduction.
It is difficult to know what is meant by "surreptitiously" taking a child. One man's
surreptition is another man's avoidance of breach of the peace. Does the Court mean to
say that it will not countenance an "unjustifiable" taking of a child, but will countenance
a "justifiable" one?
Finally, we may ask why a parent who deceitfully takes a child from the custody
of the other parent is in a worse position, legally or morally, than a parent who, as
in May v. Anderson, deceitfully keeps a child delivered to him for a visitation.
58. In New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 616 (1947), the Court
said it left undecided "whether the State which has jurisdiction over the child may,
regardless of a custody decree rendered by another State, make such orders concerning
custody as the welfare of the child from time to time requires." Presumably, this is a
reference to the power of a state, acting as parens patriae, to assume protective juris-
diction over a child. If so, under the laws of many states, the reservation is as broad
as the rule announced in Halvey. This is so because these states purport to act as
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be affected is the law of adoption. This possibility exists, first, because
in many situations a divorce custody decree is the foundation for a
subsequent adoption proceeding. Secondly, the policy consideration-
"precious parental right"-said by the Court to underlie the require-
ment of personal jurisdiction in custody cases, if it applies at all to
adoptions, applies with even greater force since adoption results in
total termination of the natural parent's rights in the child.
Adoption is a statutory system designed to provide a new parental
relation for a child whose natural parental relation has been destroyed
or seriously damaged.19 The typical adoption statute provides that
the natural parents of the child must consent to his adoption, subject
to important exceptions. In almost all of the states one exception is
parental abandonment.60 A second exception, and one of primary
importance in terms of the number of adoptions involved, is that the
father of an illegitimate child need not consent to the child's adoption.6'
parens patrae-that is, "making such orders concerning custody as the welfare of the
child from time to time requires," in deciding divorce custody. See, e.g., Application
of Anderson, 79 Idaho 68, 310 P.2d 783 (1957); Casteel v. Casteel, 45 N.J. Super. 338,
132 A.2d 529 (App. Div. 1957); Bachman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 136 N.E.2d 866
(1956); Aufiero v. Aufiero, 332 Mass. 149, 123 N.E.2d 709 (1955); Ehrenzweig, Inter-
state Recognition of Custody Decrees, supra note 13 and cases cited therein; Stansbury,
supra note 13; Comment, 37 CA in. L. Rav. 455, 461 (1949). Indeed, the New York
court invoked the parens patriae theory in the Halvey case itself. See People ex rel.
Halvey v. Halvey, 185 Misc. 52, 55 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 269
App. Div. 1019, 59 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1945), aff'd mem., 295 N.Y. 836, 66 N.E.2d 851 (1946).
In any event, the reservation of "temporary" orders would not seem to include the
permanent orders involved in adoption proceedings or in pre-adoption proceedings
terminating parental rights, discussed in the text following. Moreover, the reservation
is not expressly repeated in May v. Anderson, though possibly it was so impliedly.
59. See Note, Improving the Adoption Process: The Pennsylvania Adoption Act,
102 U. PA. L. REv 759-63 (1954), for a brief history of adoption in this country and
a detailed account of the evolution of the Pennsylvania law, which in its history is
fairly typical of most states. For a brief general discussion, select bibliography, and
citations to the various state statutes, see LEAVy, LAW OF ADoPnoN (2d ed. 1954).
60. See Note, Child Abandonment: The Botched Beginning of the Adoption Process,
60 YALE L.J. 1240 (1951); Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 662 (1954).
61. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-213(b) (Supp. 1958); Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN.
§ 199.500 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANqN. § 22-2-5 (1935). In most states an unwed mother
of an illegitimate child is treated as the child's sole parent not only for the purposes
of adoption but for most other purposes as well. However, some courts have recognized
that the father of an illegitimate child has some legally protected interest in the child's
custody. See In re Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888 (1954), and
cases cited therein. It could be argued that this interest is "precious" enough so that
due process requires the consent of, or notice to, the father prior to an adoption of
his illegitimate child, at least where he has acknowledged the child. If so, many
adoption statutes, and hundreds of adoptions based on them, are jurisdictionally de-
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Another recognized exception is that consent is not required from a
parent who has been deprived, or at least "permanently" deprived, of
the child's custody in a divorce or other proceeding. 6 Other excep-
tions include serious neglect of the child 3 and failure to perform the
obligation of support.64
The adoption statutes are based on the premise that local presence
of the child, sometimes local domicile of the child, is a sufficient juris-
dictional basis on which to proceed. 5 They require notice to the non-
consenting parent, but assume that notice is all that due process re-
quires."" None of them requires that the parent be personally served
within the state and, indeed, could not impose this requirement with-
out eliminating abandonment as a ground for dispensing with parental
consent.
The threat which May v. Anderson poses to these statutory struc-
tures, and to the human and social values which they represent, is
plain. While the facts of May v. Anderson involved divorce only,
if a divorce decree depriving a parent of custody is regarded as a
nullity because made without personal jurisdiction of the parent, it
follows that an adoption resting on the assumed validity of such a decree
is also a nullity. This would be the result in adoptions made without
fective. Furthermore, if personal jurisdiction of the natural parents is to be required
for other adoptions, as is discussed in text, it could well be contended that there
must be like personal jurisdiction of the father in the adoption of an illegitimate child.
62. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, §3 (1940); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 158, § 37 (1954);
OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.6 (Supp. 1957); see Annor., 47 A.L.R.2d 824 (1956).
63. The statutes generally require that the fact of neglect have been previously
adjudicated and the parental rights terminated in consequence. See, e.g., Aiuz. REv.
STAT. ANN. 5 8-103 (1956); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, 5 908 (1953); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 3-120 (1946); N.Y. Dom. RE.L. LAW § 111.
64. E.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-1-6 (1953); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 210, § 3 (Supp.
1958); ORE. REv. STAT. § 109.324 (1957).
65. See, e.g., CAL. Crw. CODE § 226; DEL.. CODE ANN. tit. 13, H9 906, 907 (1953); MICH.
Comp'. LAws § 710.1 (1948); 1 EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws 86 (1959). An earlier
writer has said that local domicile of the child is, or ought to be, required for adoption.
See Newbold, Jurisdictional and Social Aspects of Adoption, 11 MINN. L. Rev. 605
(1927). Neither the cases nor the statutes support him. See Stumberg, The Status
of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. Cm. L. Rev. 42 (1940); Taintor, Adoption
of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 15 U. Prr-r. L. REv. 222 (1954).
66. Presumably, the notice must be as effective as the circumstances reasonably
admit. Cf. Walker v. City of Hutchison, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The notice provisions of some adop-
tion statutes probably do not meet this standard. Cf. Annot., 76 A.L.R. 1077 (1932).
Needless to say, compliance with this standard and a requirement of personal juris-
diction in the Pennoyer v. Neff sense are two different things.
19591
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the consent of a parent previously deprived of custody in a divorce
proceeding in which he did not appear.Y6 It might also be the result
in adoptions where the non-consenting parent had been deprived of
custody for some other reason. If May v. Anderson were applied only
this far, the consequences would be serious enough. But it does not
take great powers of advocacy to make out a case for applying May
v. Anderson to any adoption proceeding in which the non-consenting
parent has not been personally served within the state: if a parent
cannot be deprived of the "precious" right of custody without such
service, a fortiori he cannot be deprived of all legal relationship to the
child without being personally served.
Grounds can be found for distinguishing May v. Anderson. Probably
the best ground is simply that the intensity of the public interest in
adoption cases is so much higher than in divorce custody cases that the
value of giving the parent the protection of personal service of process
is overriden by the value of giving the child a legally unassailable
parentage."" I do not suggest that this distinction is particularly
logical. 9 But if the Supreme Court insists on adhering to the personal
jurisdiction rule in divorce custody cases, grounds for distinction must
be found.70
67. See In re Adoption of a Minor, 214 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (problem raised but
decision unnecessary); cf. Moss v. Ingram, 246 Ala. 214, 20 So. 2d 202 (1944).
68. Other grounds include the following: (1) Differentiation between the effect to be
given a divorce custody decree and a decree entered in a proceeding in which the state
asserts an interest in the child's welfare on grounds other than the divorce of his parents.
As has been noted, many courts treat the two situations as indistinguishable occasions
for parens patriae jurisdiction. See note 58 supra. Judge Cardozo sharply distinguished
the two. See note 56 supra. In many cases, a line of demarcation can perhaps be observed
between welfare of the child as a basis for awarding custody between his parents and
welfare of the child as an independent basis of state concern. But the divorce itself
and particularly the ensuing custody struggles, frequently produce disturbances in
the child which are a sufficient independent basis for state intervention under parens
patriae. (2) Differentiation could be made between decrees which affect "status" and
those which do not-defining the former as including adjudications which have a
more or less permanent, as distinct from temporary, character. The trouble with
this approach is that the permanency of a decree is only one factor to be considered
in evaluating the due process and full faith and credit problems. Another factor is
the importance of stabilizing the decree, whether temporary or permanent. Thus,
an order divesting a parent of custody because of abuse of the child might be for
a temporary probationary period, but during that period it would be vital to assure
that the decree was obeyed and recognized.
69. For the reason that the interest in protecting the parent also increases as the
consequences of the proposed legal action approach and reach finality.
70. Even if grounds for distinction are found, of course, the familial status of many
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This is not a matter de minimis. "At the present time some 75,000
adoption petitions are filed annually in American courts, an estimated
increase of more than 500 percent over the level of twenty years
ago." 71 On the basis of available figures, therefore, it can be estimated
that there are roughly half a million people alive today whose filial
status depends upon adoption. Most certainly a significant percentage
of these people were adopted in proceedings in which no personal
jurisdiction was obtained of a non-consenting parent. A considerable
number were adopted in cases where the non-consenting parent had
abandoned the child.7 1 In addition to this harvest of human misery to
be reaped on past adoptions is the impending constriction of adoption
as an effective device for giving new homes to the children of ad-
versity.73 In the light of these prospects, was Justice Burton correct
in suggesting that the issue before him was "narrow"?
Justice Frankfurter's view does not lead to all the difficulties which
attend Justice Burton's. But it is not clear where his approach does
adopted children is now in jeopardy. This follows from the conventions of con-
stitutional law under which a decision today that due process is denied by failure to
obtain personal jurisdiction is a decision that such a failure was in the past also a
denial of due process. Since the defect is jurisdictional, res judicata will not save it.
Compare Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940),
'with McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
71. GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAu.IIEs IN THE COURTS or NEWv YoRK CITY 241 (1954).
72. I know of no statistical studies on this point. The conclusion is drawn from
consultation with social workers in the adoption field, judges having adoption jurisdic-
tion, and lawyers who do adoption work frequently.
73. There is still some controversy about the wisdom of permitting adoptions. Most
of it arises from the fact that in the past no adequate investigation was made of the
suitability of the prospective adoptive home, a matter which is being remedied in
most states. See, e.g., CAi. CIV. CODE § 226; DvMAss. ANN. LAws c. 210, § 5A (1955); Cf.
N.Y. Domr. REL. LAW § 112; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1 (Supp. 1958). Reliable informa-
tion about the social and psychological consequences of adoption is almost non-
existent. The Children's Bureau of the U.S. Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare
is presently cooperating with the State of Florida in a long term study of the subject.
It is too early to make trustworthy statements on the matter. On the other hand, legal
impediments to adoption-flowing from due process problems or otherwise-frequently
result in long term institutionalization of children. See, e.g., Note, Termination of
Parental Rights to Free Child for Adoption, 32 N.Y.UL.Q. 579 (1957). There is
evidence that such institutionalization has a damaging effect on children, how great
an effect being the subject of study and controversy. The Division of Research of
the Children's Bureau is keeping track of the work on the subject. In any case, adoption
is clearly a social experiment for legislative management. The judiciary should take
care not to impose, in the name of due process, laboratory conditions which make
the adoption experiment impossible.
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lead in connection with adoption. The following questions, among
others, present themselves:
(1) If a custody decree is not entitled to full faith and credit, may
it still be treated as a valid substitute for parental consent under an
adoption statute which makes unnecessary the consent of a parent who
has been deprived of custody?
(2) If the custody decree may be treated as valid in the forum
granting the adoption, must the adoptive decree itself be given full
faith and credit elsewhere? In the state where the non-consenting parent
is domiciled? In the state where the child was domiciled in the im-
mediate past? 74
(3) Is any adoption decree entitled to full faith and credit? Is it
entitled to such credit in the state where the non-consenting parent
is and has been domiciled? In the state in which the child was domiciled
in the immediate past? Does this mean that the rendering state has
a supervening interest in permanently cutting off rights to a child
within its borders, as in adoption, but only a coordinate interest in
temporarily cutting off such rights, as in divorce custody?
(4) What faith and credit should be given to a temporary order
terminating parental custody for a fixed or indeterminate trial period,
as is sometimes done in guardianship and juvenile court proceedings?
(5) If these various types of orders are to be given different faith
and credit, on what bases can classification be made? In view of the
infinite variety of fact situations in custody matters, how stable could
a classification system be?
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
We have seen that May v. Anderson carries serious implications for
the law of adoption. Its implications for juvenile courts and juvenile
law are similar and hardly less serious, for the types of orders involved
and the due process and full faith and credit problems are legally
quite alike.75
All of the states have specialized procedures, in many instances
specialized courts, for handling a cluster of problems relating to chil-
dren. The court in which these procedures apply is known as the
74. See Moss v. Ingram, 246 Ala. 214, 20 So. 2d 202 (1944).
75. The saving language in Halvey discussed in note 58 supra, if it survives May
v. Anderson, would forfend some of the problems regarding juvenile court orders,
but how many and why is not clear. See notes 58 & 68 supra.
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juvenile court. From state to state there are many differences in the
form and substance of juvenile jurisdiction, but everywhere the juris-
diction extends in greater or lesser degree to two interrelated problems:
first, juvenile delinquency, 76 which includes antisocial behavior by
the child-usually conduct which would be criminal if done by an adult,
but also including behavior indicating incipient criminality; 77 second,
child neglect, sometimes called child dependency,78 which includes
parental conduct detrimental to the child-usually cruelty or abandon-
ment, but also including failure to educate the child or to provide him
with a necessary minimum of food, clothing, shelter, or care.79
The juvenile court is thus the legal institution through which society
most commonly comes to grips with the monumental problems of
juvenile delinquency and parental failure. The historic roots of this
institution have never been thoroughly studied. 0 In part, the creation
of the juvenile court was the culmination of a long reform movement
directed at the harsh consequences of treating youthful law violators
in the same way as adult offenders. In part, the juvenile court was the
successor to the historic powers of courts of equity to intervene, on
behalf of the sovereign as parens patriae, to protect a child from parental
abuse, neglect, or indifference. While the first of these, the supplanting
of criminal procedure, was directed primarily at delinquency, and the
second, the accession to the powers of equity courts, was directed at
76. For a brief general discussion along with the text of the 1949 Revision of the
Standard Juvenile Court Act [hereinafter cited as the Standard Act] drafted by the
National Probation and Parole Association, see SussmAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1950).
For a brief critical discussion, see Herman, Scope and Purposes of Juvenile Court
jurisdiction, 48 J. CuaRi. L., C. & P. S. 590 (1958). For more extended discussions, see
RuBiN, CIRara AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A RATIONAL APPROACH TO PENAL PROBIXarS
(1958); TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1949). For a select bibliography, see NATIONAL
PROBATION & PAROLE Ass'N, SELECTED READING LIST IN DELINQUENCY & CIAMr (1958).
77. E.g., Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-201 (1956); IOWA CODE § 232.3 (1958); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:2 (1955); STANDARD ACT § 7.
78. The legal literature on child neglect is limited. The literature on social work
and related fields is voluminous. The Children's Bureau has prepared bibliographies,
and brief discussions can be found in the Social Work Yearbook, an annual publication.
79. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-203 (1947); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52 (1957); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 62,040 (1957); STANDARD ACT § 7.
80. There are a number of brief accounts. See, e.g., Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE
UNITED STATES ch.2 (1927). For more recent developments, see U.N. DFu'T OF SOCIAL
AFFAIRS, COMPARATIVE SURVEY ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY pt. I, North America (1952)
(Paul W. Tappan). For a comprehensive study of the development of child welfare
legislation in a single state see O'BRIEN, CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION IN MARYLAND,
1634-1936 (1937).
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child neglect, the two are necessarily interwoven."' At present, juvenile
courts are the subject of searching re-examination and debate. As a
leading student of the subject has said, "Children's courts are still
today in the process of evolution throughout [the country] as to
methods, procedures, goals, jurisdictional coverage, quality and adequacy
of personnel, and other related matters." 82
It is beyond the scope of discussion here to consider the manifold
issues presented by juvenile delinquency and child dependency or the
efficacy and wisdom of the present juvenile court procedures. It is
enough to say that all responsible authorities agree that there are im-
portant classes of cases where the juvenile court must intervene to
restrict or terminate the rights of the parent in his child. That inter-
vention may occur in one of the following ways:
(1) The child may be institutionalized."3 In the case of a delinquent,
the institution may be a detention facility (temporary detention pend-
ing disposition of his case), a training school, or a forestry camp, a
hospital if the child is mentally disturbed or mentally retarded, or some
other sort of institution. In the case of a neglected child, the institution
may be a foundling home, orphanage, school, or hospital.
(2) The child may be placed in a foster home.84 This disposition
81. They are interwoven legally because the powers are generally vested in a single
court and because the statutory definitions of "delinquency" and "child neglect" over-
lap. They are interwoven factually because of the following casually related circum-
stances. (1) In many delinquency cases, an investigation of the child's background
will disclose that he has also been subject to parental misfeasance amounting to child
neglect. (2) The antecedent parental failings are frequently the cause of the de-
linquency. See GLuEt, UNRAVELLINTG JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1950). (3) Because of
(1) and (2), a child neglect proceeding early in the child's life may make unnecessary
a delinquency proceeding later on. (4) The ultimate objective in both types of pro-
ceedings is to maintain the child as a socially useful and acceptable human being, and
at the same time to protect society against the consequences of the child's behavior
and/or the failings of his parents. In the light of these considerations, it seems
erroneous to suggest that the parens patriae concept has no relevance to juvenile de-
linquency, as distinct from child neglect. See Note, Misapplication of the Parens
Patriae Power in Delinquency Proceedings, 29 IND. L.J. 475 (1954). It is, of course,
something else again to suggest that, under whatever name the state intervenes, "parents
should not be deprived of the custody of their children unless it is conclusively proved
in the juvenile court that by reason of their incompetency the best interests of the
child require state intervention." Id. at 484.
82. U.N. DEP'r OF SocAL AFFAIRS, op. cit. supra note 80, at 15. For an example of
this evolution, see casenote, 45 VA. L. REv. 436 (1959).
83. E.g., MoNT. REv. CoDEs ANN. § 10-611 (1947); NJ. Rev. STAT. § 2A:4-37 (1953);
VA. CODE AN. §§ 16.1-197 to -202.9 (Supp. 1956); STANDARD ACT § 18(1).
84. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-09 (1942); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-30 (1953);
W. VA. CODE § 4904(61) (1955); STANDARD Act § 18(1).
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is generally encountered with respect to neglected children but is
occasionally employed for delinquents. The foster home is a private
home, usually licensed or regulated by public authority, into which
the child is taken on a short or long term basis. The child lives in
the community, goes to school, and otherwise conducts himself as
any other child. Depending on the skill and compassion of the foster
parents, he may become an integral part of the foster home unit.
(3) The child may be legally severed from his parents as a prelimi-
nary to some other disposition, typically adoption or foster home place-
ment. 5 This disposition, usually referred to as "termination of parental
rights," is frequently employed in abandonment cases, especially of
infants or very young children.
(4) The child may be required to undergo special treatment of
some sort, either in a residence institution or on an "out-patient" basis.86
For example, corrective surgery, psychiatric or psychological care,
dentistry, or some other sort of treatment may be ordered where the
parent is unwilling to provide it.
(5) The child may be placed under supervision but allowed to re-
main in his own home.87 Supervision of delinquents is usually called
"probation"; supervision of neglected children is usually known as
"protective supervision" or by a term of similar import. In connection
with the supervision, conditions and limitations may be imposed on the
child's conduct (such as that he refrain from associating with a certain
gang) or on the parent (such as that the child be kept in school and
not sent out to work).
There are other types of disposition in some states and communities,
and obviously the same child may be the subject of different successive
dispositions. But the foregoing sufficiently describes juvenile court
practice for present purposes.
It should be clear that the first three types of disposition-institutional-
ization, foster home placement, and termination of parental rights-
necessarily involve a deprivation of parental custody. It is also clear
that the fourth type of disposition-special treatment-may involve dep-
rivation of parental custody, and that the fourth and fifth types of
85. E.g., Du,. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1101 to 10 (1953); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-303
(1949); WASH. REv. CODE § 13.04.090 (1956); SrANDmw Acr § 23.
86. E.g., Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-235 (1956); MinN. STAT. § 260.11 (1957); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-258 (Cum. Supp. 1958); STANDARD Acr § 18(3).
87. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-29 (1952); OHIo REv. CODE § 2151.35 (Page Supp.
1958); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-32 to -33 (1956); SrAxDAn Acr § 18(1).
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disposition in any case represent a curtailment of the parental sovereignty
which is otherwise a concomitant of custody. Finally, it should be
evident that the success of any of these dispositions will be jeopardized
or frustrated unless the (by hypothesis) damaging or disruptive con-
duct or presence of the parent is foreclosed.
The jurisdictional basis on which the juvenile courts operate is the
presence of the child.88 The domicile of the child, the domicile of the
parents, and the presence of the parents are assumed by all the statutes
to be immaterial. Most of the statutes require or contemplate notice
to the parents in any proceeding concerning the child, but all of them
assume that notice alone, and not personal jurisdiction, sufficiently
affords the parents due process."'
It would be redundant to demonstrate the number of familial and
societal relationships embraced in this complex structure 0 It cannot
number less than thousands and may run into hundreds of thousands.
But a few hypothetical cases, drawn from the daily experience of
anyone in the field, will illustrate the social and legal problems better
than a statistical broadside.
Case A: It is harvest time in the truck garden district of an eastern
state. Hundreds of migratory workers have come in to pick the crop.
They have brought their families and live in barracks, shacks, trailers,
and other temporary accommodations. None of them is in the telephone
book, the voter registration lists, the local unemployment rolls, or is
known to the local postmaster. The contractor who arranged their
employment and the farmer who hired them have incomplete, inaccurate
lists of the names of those able to work, and no record at all of young
children. The season ends, the migrants move on to destinations un-
known, leaving no forwarding address with anyone. A three year
old boy is found wandering around the deserted trailer camp. The boy
88. See Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 IMl. 287, 100 N.E. 892 (1913) (leading case); cf.
Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 NE. 624 (1925). For statutory language, see, e.g.,
CAL. W=ARLAE & INST'NS CODE § 700; D.C. CODE ArN. § 11-906 (1951); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 208.020 (1955); STANDARD AcT § 7.
89. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.06 (1957); LA. REV. STAT. § 13:1575 (1950); ORE.
REv. STAT. §§ 419.506 to .514 (1957). For a collection of cases, see Annor., 76 A.L.R. 242
(1932). On the sufficiency of notice, see note 66 supra. For an excellent discussion
of procedural due process in delinquency proceedings, see Paulsen, Fairness to the
Juvenile Offender, 41 MiNN. L. REv. 547 (1957).
90. The Children's Bureau regularly publishes statistical summaries of juvenile court
business, based, however, on incomplete returns from the roughly 2,500 juvenile courts
throughout the country. The data in these summaries is necessarily limited but does
reveal the enormous dimensions of the problem.
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is in good health, of normal intelligence and utterly unidentifiable. He
is turned over to the local police and by them to the Humane Society.
Case B: The John Smiths live in a small rented house in a town in
the Pacific Northwest. He is a laborer, she a housewife. They have
three children. Unemployment is prevalent locally and the Smiths
decide to head for Los Angeles in hopes of finding something better.
Their oldest child, a girl of 10, has been ill and the Smiths conclude
it would be unwise to take her on the journey. They prevail on their
neighbors to take in the girl until they "get a place and send the money
for her bus ticket." The Smiths leave. Two months go by. The
neighbors hear nothing from the Smiths and consult the local welfare
department. The department tells them to hold on for a while. A
month later, the Smiths send a card, bearing no return address, saying
"Things slow here too. Will send money as soon as we can." Six
months go by. There is no further word from the Smiths. The neigh-
bors now come into the local welfare department again. Interviews
with the child indicate that she is badly upset by the disappearance
of her parents but that she seems to be gaining a growing affection for
the neighbors with whom she is living.
Case C: The Browns lived in a midwestern state. They were married
17 years ago and had a boy, John, who is now 15. Six years ago the
Browns were divorced in a default proceeding in which the mother
was given John's custody and the father ordered to pay for his support.
The father made these payments for six months, then moved to another
state and since then has neither corresponded with the mother nor sent
her the support payments. Several years ago the mother remarried.
Relations between John and his stepfather were never good and de-
teriorated. John began to hang around with a gang, was involved in
a car theft, was caught and put on probation. He violated his pro-
bation by "borrowing" a car and going joy riding, and was thereupon
sent to the state training school. After a year in the training school,
he was paroled to a foster family with whom he has lived for the last
three months. He is in public school, has kept out of trouble and seems
to be making a fairly good adjustment. Last month his father heard
from a relative what had happened to John. His father still lives in
the other state, has remarried and says he wants his son back "so we
can be pals again." The last time his father saw John was when John
was nine.
If anyone unfamiliar with the field suspects these illustrations to
be exaggerations, let him go down to the local juvenile court or wel-
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fare department and find out for himself. The problems which are
involved in the hypothetical cases and thousands like them are the prob-
lems with which the ranks of public servants in the line-the trial
judges, probation officers, social workers-have to contend. What
sort of generalship is to be found in May v. Anderson? Each one of
these situations presents a pressing social and human problem requir-
ing effective solution. None of these problems can be effectively
solved under the requirements of the personal jurisdiction rule. In
none of them, moreover, is the exaltation of "precious" parental rights
the exclusive, or even a very helpful, guide to action.
CONCLUSION
May v. Anderson was decided on grounds unnecessary under the
facts presented, untenable in the precedents decided, and uncompre-
hending of the consequences possibly to follow. In divorce custody
cases its disruptive effects are already being felt throughout the land.
Its rationale can be extended to adoption law and to juvenile law, where,
if applied, it will have an even more disruptive effect. The decision is
surely a mistake. It needs judicial re-examination.
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